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The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
II. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW AND 
SUPPORTING AUTHORITY 
A. Did the Trial court err in awarding Page Electric pre-judgment interest despite 
Glendon's tender of payment? 
Standard of Review: The propriety of pre-judgment interest is a question of law 
which an appellate court reviews for correctness, according no particular deference to 
the trial court's conclusion. Hermes Associates v. Park's Sportsman. 813 P.2d 1221, 
1223 (Utah App. 1991). 
B. Was there a written contract between Page Electric and Glendon? 
Standard of Review: Whether a contract exists between parties is a question of 
law which an appellate court reviews for correctness, according no particular deference 
to the trial court's conclusion. Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. v Ouintek. 834 P.2d 582, 583 
(Utah App. 1992). 
C. Was the contract between Page Electric and Glendon ambiguous? 
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Standard of Review: Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law which 
an appellate court reviews for correctness, according no particular deference to the trial 
court's conclusion. Lyngle v. Lyngle. 831 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah App. 1992); West 
Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah 1991); Winegar v. Froerer 
Corp.. 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991); Plateau Min. v. Utah Div. of State Lands 802 P.2d 
720 (Utah 1990); Village Inn Apartments v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.. 790 P.2d 
581, 582 (Utah App. 1990); Ted R. Brown and Assoc, v. Carnes Corp.. 753 P.2d 964 
(Utah App. 1988). 
D. Did the Trial court err in failing to reduce the judgment by the amount of 
liquidated damages Glendon assessed to Page Electric? 
Standard of Review: The propriety of Liquidated damages is a question of law 
which an appellate court reviews for correctness, according no particular deference to 
the trial court's conclusion. Kvassay v. Murray. 808 P.2d 896, 898 & 900, 15 Kan. 
App. 2d 426 (1991). 
E. Did the Trial court err in denying defendant's Motion to Amend Findings and 
Judgment or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial because the evidence was insufficient 
as a matter of law to support the amount of the judgment? 
Standard of Review: Is the evidence insufficient to support the amount of 
judgment? Hansen v. Stewart. 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988). 
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F. Did the Trial court err in awarding Page Electric $338.47 per building to 
replace damaged or defective lights at the Murray and Orem Autozones? 
Standard of Review: An appellate court will not set aside a trial court's factual 
findings unless they are against the clear weight of evidence or the appellate court 
otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. A finding 
is clearly erroneous if it is without adequate evidentiary support or is induced by an 
erroneous view of the law. Hoth v. White. 799 P.2d 213 (Utah App. 1990). 
G. Did the Trial court err in refusing to allow closing argument at trial? 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion affecting a party's substantial rights. 
Erickson v. Wasatch Manor. Inc.. 802 P.2d 1323 (Utah App. 1990). 
H. Did the Trial court err in disregarding defendant's request for oral argument 
on its post-trial motion? 
Standard of Review: Same as stated in issues A - D above. 
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m. 
STATUTES AND RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION 
IS DETERMINATIVE 
A. Utah Code Ann. Section 78-27-3 (1953). The foregoing statute is set forth 
verbatim and attached hereto as Addendum A. 
B. Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-501 (3)(b),(c) & (d). The 
foregoing rule is set forth verbatim and attached hereto as Addendum B. 
C. Utah Code Ann. Section 14-2-1 (1989). The foregoing statute is set forth 
verbatim and attached hereto as Addendum C. 
rv. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
This case involves a contract dispute between GLENDON CORPORATION 
("Glendon"), a General construction contractor, and PAGE ELECTRIC SERVICE, INC. 
("Page Electric") its subcontractor. Page Electric sued Glendon's surety, THE OHIO 
CASUALTY GROUP OF INSURANCE COMPANIES ("Ohio Casualty"), on a payment 
bond pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 14-2-1 (1989). 
Page Electric's complaint against Ohio casualty, served October 9, 1991, claimed 
amounts owing by Glendon for labor and materials provided in the construction of three 
Autozone automotive retail stores located in Davis County ("Bountiful Autozone"), Salt 
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Lake County ("Murray Autozone"), and Utah County ("Orem Autozone"). Page 
Electric's claims totalled $33,050.52 plus interest, costs and attorney fees. (Record on 
Appeal, hereinafter "R.", 1-4). 
On December 31, 1991, Ohio Casualty made a formal offer of judgment to Page 
Electric in the amount of $22,243.53. (R. 11). Ohio Casualty increased its formal offer 
of judgment to $25,000.00 on May 26, 1992. (R. 23). Page Electric rejected both 
offers. 
The case was tried before the Honorable Rodney S. Page on June 8 and 10, 1992. 
(R. 60, 61). After Page Electric presented its case in chief, Ohio Casualty moved to 
dismiss based on Page Electric's failure to comply with the notice requirement of Utah 
Code Ann. Section 14-2-5 (1989). (Transcript on Appeal, hereinafter "Tr.", 135-146). 
The trial court denied the motion, specifically finding that Page Electric was in privity 
of contract with Glendon, therefore, the notice requirement did not apply. (Tr. 144-146). 
The court awarded Page Electric judgment in the amount of $25,935.04 plus 
prejudgment interest, costs and attorney fees. The Judgment, and Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law were entered August 6, 1992. (R. 66-74). A copy of the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law is attached hereto as Addendum D. 
Ohio Casualty moved to amend the findings and judgment or in the alternative, 
for a new trial on August 14, 1992. (R. 75-76). The court issued a ruling denying the 
motion on January 18, 1993 (R. 101-102) and entered an order on the ruling February 
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3, 1993. (R. 105-106). Ohio Casualty filed its Notice of Appeal on March 4, 1993. (R. 
108-109). 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Glendon's Subcontracts with Page Electric 
On May 7, 1990, Glendon contracted with AUTOZONE INCORPORATED 
("Autozone") to build the Murray, Orem and Bountiful Autozones. (Defendant's Exhibit, 
hereinafter "DEx." 17, 18 and 19). Glendon solicited bids from subcontractors for most 
of the work on the Autozones, including a bid from Page Electric to install the electrical 
hardware at each store. (Tr. 150). Before submitting a bid, Merlin Page, an owner of 
Page Electric (Tr. 74), completed and signed a subcontractor pre-qualification form that 
contained the following language at paragraph 4 (d): 
The acceptance by Glendon Corporation for [sic] this 
quotation shall create a binding and enforceable contract of 
sale, dating from the time of said acceptance, without any 
further action by either party and even though a written 
purchase order has not been furnished to or received by the 
successful bidder. Said created contract of sale shall 
include all of the provisions and specifications of the 
request for quotation, offer, acceptance and purchase order 
relating thereto. . . . 
(DEx. 21, Tr. 164-165). A copy of Defendant's Exhibit 21 is attached hereto as 
Addendum E. 
After receiving Glendon's request to bid, Merlin Page visited Glendon's office 
and reviewed the plans and specifications for the Autozones. (Tr. 152-154, DEx. 15 and 
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16.) The Murray and Orem Autozones are block buildings, 8100 square feet in size, and 
identified as an 8100 super store. The Bountiful Autozone is a metal building, 5400 
square feet in size, and identified as a 5400 store. (Tr. 70, 153). 
Page Electric submitted its bid to Glendon by letter dated April 16, 1990. 
(Plaintiff s Exhibit, hereinafter "PEx." 1, Tr. 11-14). Glendon accepted Page Electric's 
bid and requested additional information necessary to prepare formal subcontracts. (PEx. 
4 and 5, Tr. 14-15). 
On August 16, 1990, Glendon held a preconstruction meeting for the Autozone 
projects at its office. Kevin Page represented Page Electric at the meeting. Steve Lefler, 
supervisor of the Autozone projects for Glendon, conducted the meeting. (Tr. 185). 
Lefler explained the strict time schedules for construction of the Autozones (DEx. 1, Tr. 
159, 161, 95), that change orders had to be approved (Tr. 80, 84, 85, 83-94, 192-193), 
and various other aspects of the Autozones' construction. (DEx. 1, Tr. 158-163, 186-
188). Either prior to, or during the meeting, Glendon presented three written 
subcontracts to Page Electric, one for each store. (Tr. 67, 163). The contracts were 
identical except for the names of the Autozones. (Tr. 67). Page Electric was instructed 
to sign the subcontracts but failed to do so. (DEx. 11, Tr. 161, 68, 187). Nevertheless, 
Page Electric proceeded with the electrical work on the Autozones. 
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The subcontracts incorporated the prime contracts, plans and specifications, and 
job schedules. (DEx. 11, Tr. 272). Glendon made these documents available for review 
by all subcontractors. (Tr. 268-269, 271, 162, 99, 67, 71-72). 
2. Liquidated Damages and Additional Damages 
The plans and specifications (DEx. 15, 16) and prime contracts (DEx. 17, 18, 19) 
contained a uniform liquidated damages provision of $300.00 per day for late completion 
and a bonus provision of $200.00 per day for early completion. Paragraph 2 of the 
subcontracts stated: 
The subcontractor agrees to reimburse the contractor for 
any and all liquidated damages that may be assessed against 
and collected from the contractor by the owner, which are 
attributable or caused by the subcontractor's failure to 
furnish the materials and perform the work required by this 
contract within the time fixed in the manner provided for 
herein, and in addition thereto, agrees to pay to the 
contractor such other additional damages as contractor may 
sustain by reason of such delay by the subcontractor . . . . 
(DEx. 11). A copy of the subcontract is attached hereto as Addendum F. 
The plans and specifications required Glendon to substantially complete the 
Bountiful Autozone in 65 calendar days and the Murray and Orem Autozones in 80 
calendar days. (DEx. 15, 16). These demanding schedules prompted Glendon to 
implement a critical path method of scheduling subcontract work. Glendon used a 
computer to calculate and track the number of days a subcontractor was on the critical 
path and to direct the course of construction so Glendon would meet its completion 
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deadlines. (Tr. 282). Glendon also input information about change orders into the 
computer. (Tr. 283). 
Glendon completed the Bountiful Autozone on schedule but failed to meet the 
completion deadlines for the Murray and Orem Autozones. Glendon's actual completion 
date on the Murray Autozone exceeded the contract completion date by 20 days. (DEx. 
7, 9). Autozone assessed liquidated damages of $300.00 per day or a total of $6,000.00 
pursuant to the terms of the prime contract. (DEx. 7, 8). Glendon in turn assessed its 
subcontractors for actual delay to the critical path schedules pursuant to the 
reimbursement clause in its subcontracts. Page Electric was not assessed damages on the 
Orem Autozone because it did not delay the critical path schedule but was assessed the 
sum of $1,263.16 as its pro rata share of damages on the Murray Autozone. (DEx. 9, 
Tr. 221-222, 248-250, 212-214). Copies of Defendant's Exhibits 7, 8 and 9 are attached 
hereto as Addendum G. 
3. Page Electric's Extra Charges for Replacing Damaged or Defective 
Ballasts 
Autozone supplied electrical hardware for the Autozone stores directly to Page 
Electric through its supplier, TEC of Jonesboro, Arkansas. On November 6, 1990 TEC 
shipped ballasts to Page Electric to replace damaged or defective ballasts that had been 
previously supplied. (DEx. 20). Steve Lefler sent a memorandum to Page Electric on 
January 16, 1991 explaining that Autozone was charging Glendon $338.47 per building 
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on the Murray and Orem Autozones because defective or damaged ballasts were never 
returned to TEC. (PEx. 14). A copy of Plaintiffs Exhibit 14 is attached hereto as 
Addendum H. The same day, Glendon prepared negative change orders to reduce the 
amount of Page Electric's contract on each store by $338.47. (DEx. 25a). 
Page Electric returned the damaged or defective ballasts to TEC on January 23, 
1991 (DEx. 20) and responded to Glendon's memorandum the same day. (PEx. 14). 
TEC reimbursed Page Electric's shipping costs by check dated January 29, 1991. (DEx. 
20). Autozone never reimbursed Glendon for the $338.47 it deducted from both prime 
contracts. (Tr. 210, 223-224, 242-243, 256-258). 
Kelly Page testified at trial that Page Electric charged Glendon $338.47 extra on 
the Murray and Orem Autozones to change the ballasts. (Tr. 107-109). He admitted 
that Page Electric did not test the ballasts before installing them in the fixtures. (Tr. 
110). Kevin Page testified that he met with representatives of Glendon who claimed 
negative change orders of $338.47 on the Murray and Orem contracts for Page Electric's 
failure to return damaged or defective ballasts. Kevin produced records (DEx. 20) 
proving that the ballasts had been returned. He then recorded positive change orders for 
the Murray and Orem stores to offset Glendon's negative change orders and incorporated 
this information into his July 1991 billing statement to Glendon. The statement, however, 
failed to account for Glendon's negative change orders. (Tr. 82-83, PEx. 10). 
4. Glendon's Tender of Payment to Page Electric 
11 
On November 21, 1990, Glendon sent check number 6388 to Page Electric in the 
amount of $297.00 to pay for installation of the temporary electrical hook-up on the 
Murray Autozone. The reverse of the check contained the following endorsement 
provision: 
By endorsement hereon, the payee acknowledges receipt of 
the amount of this check in full payment and satisfaction 
for all work performed and/or materials furnished on the 
premises as described on the face hereof to date shown 
below, and waives all rights to mechanic's and/or 
materialman's lien therefor. Must be endorsed by the 
payee in person, or if a corporation, must be signed by an 
officer giving his title. 
Date 
(DEx. 2). 
Jeanene S. Page, president of Page Electric (Tr. 74), endorsed the reverse of the 
check and inserted the date of December 20, 1990. She also wrote, "payment in full on 
invoice number 3095". Page Electric negotiated the check. (DEx. 2, 26). 
On December 10th, 12th and 20th, 1990 Glendon sent checks numbered 6538, 
6560 and 6598 totalling $18,067.80 to Page Electric. Glendon's tender exceeded the 
total amount payable to Page Electric at that time under the terms of the parties' 
subcontracts. (PEx, 9, DEx 11). The reverse of these three checks contained the same 
endorsement provision as check number 6388. Page Electric refused Glendon's tender 
by returning the three checks, certified mail, on or about February 6, 1991. Included 
in the envelope was a hand-written note that read: 
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6-5-91 I've been advised to refuse the enclosed checks 
because with this stamp, you cannot pay partially-we will 
accept payment in full as invoiced only. NOW! Jeanene S. 
Page, Page Electric. 
(DEx. 2, Tr. 273-281, 284-287, PEx. 9). (Emphasis in original). 
5. Rulings by the Trial Court 
The trial court ruled that there was no written agreement between Page Electric 
and Glendon. (Tr. 323). There was, however, an oral contract evidenced by certain 
writings. The court specifically stated that these written contract documents included the 
construction plans and site plans, and inferred that the prime contract, subcontract, and 
addenda were also included. (Tr. 322, 323). 
The court ruled that Glendon and Page Electric contemplated there would be 
change orders during the course of construction. (Tr. 322, 323-324). The procedure for 
submitting change orders was ambiguous and neither Glendon nor Page Electric complied 
with the change order procedures described in the subcontract. (Tr. 323, 324). Most of 
Page Electric's change orders were for work that was contemplated in the original 
agreement (but somehow overlooked by Page Electric). (Tr. 324). However, it was 
uncontroverted at trial that the parking lights at the Murray Autozone and the additional 
Rooftop HVAC units for the Murray and Orem Autozones were appropriate change 
orders. (Tr. 325, 328). 
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According to the trial Court, the parties' agreement contemplated progress 
payments to Page Electric as Glendon received progress payments from Autozone. (Tr. 
323). The checks tendered to Page Electric contained a release of lien on all sums due 
and owing to a certain date which justified Page Electric's rejection of the tender. (Tr. 
328). 
The court ruled that Page Electric was given notice of the liquidated damages 
provisions in the contract documents, however, "in light of the extras that were charged 
relative to the Murray store, there is no indication that the extra days were in fact used 
in doing those extras or in some other way, and therefore the court denies any liquidated 
damages apportioned to these plaintiffs in this particular case." (Tr. 326-327). 
The court ruled that Page Electric was entitled to the extra sum of $338.47 for 
replacing defective lighting ballasts at the Murray Autozone. The court's findings applied 
the extra $338.47 to both the Orem and Murray contracts. The judge reasoned that 
Glendon was advised Page Electric returned the defective equipment in January 1991 but 
did not seek reimbursement even though Glendon's dealings with Autozone did not end 
until April 1991. (Tr. 325, 326). 
At trial, Ohio Casualty's counsel questioned Glendon's supervisor, Steve Lefler, 
about the nature and amounts of the various change orders on the Autozones. At the end 
of his questioning, counsel said to the trial judge, "your Honor would you like me to take 
the time to do the addition now or would you like to do it?" The judge responded, "you 
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can do it later when you make your [closing] argument." (Tr. 227). Later, the court 
required counsel to forego closing arguments. (Tr. 321). 
Ohio Casualty requested oral argument on its Motion to Amend Findings and 
Judgment or, in the Alternative, For a New Trial filed August 14, 1992. (R. 75-76, 85-
86). The trial court disregarded, without explanation, Ohio Casualty's request and issued 
its ruling denying the motion on January 18, 1993. (R. 101-102). A copy of the trial 
court's ruling is attached hereto as Addendum I. 
V. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that a tender rejected by an obligee 
stops the running of interest. In December 1990, Glendon tendered three checks to Page 
Electric that were later rejected. The trial court should not have awarded prejudgment 
interest at least, on the amount of the three checks. 
The endorsement provision on the reverse of the three checks does not justify 
rejection of Glendon's tender because Page Electric could have qualified its endorsement 
as it did on another Glendon check. Page Electric waived any objection it had to 
Glendon's tender by failing to comply with Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-3 (1953). 
Page Electric sued Ohio Casualty on payment bonds limited to "a sum equal to 
the contract price". The award of prejudgment interest causes the judgment to exceed 
the amounts of the payment bonds. 
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B. The contract between Glendon and Page Electric was in writing and not 
ambiguous. The parties' failure to comply with the change order provisions in the 
subcontract did not make the contract ambiguous. 
C. Since the agreement between Glendon and Page Electric was in writing and 
not ambiguous, the trial court should have strictly applied the liquidated damages clause 
in the subcontract. Glendon assessed damages to subcontractors based solely on their pro 
rata share of actual delay to the critical path schedule. No evidence was presented at 
trial that Page Electric was assessed liquidated damages for time spent working on 
change orders. 
D. The trial court's award of $338.47 per building on the Murray and Orem 
Autozones for replacing damages or defective lighting was erroneous and not supported 
by sufficient evidence as a matter of law. The amounts awarded ($338.47) were 
originally charges by Glendon to Page Electric for failure to return damaged or defective 
lighting to Autozone's supplier TEC. When the lighting was later returned the amounts 
deducted should have been added to Page Electric's contract thus creating a "wash" 
transaction. Instead, Page Electric added these amounts to its contract but made no 
corresponding reduction which inappropriately increased the amount of Page Electric's 
contract. These amounts were added to Page Electric's July 1991 billing statement and 
incorrectly designated as an installation charge. 
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The trial courts denial of Glendon's liquidated damages assessment to Page 
Electric was also erroneous and not supported by sufficient evidence. 
E. The trial court failed to comply with Rule 4-501 (3)(b)(c) and (d) of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration in disregarding Ohio Casualty's request for oral 
argument on its post-trial motion. The need for oral argument was underscored by the 
trial court's nonresponsive and partially irrelevant ruling of January 18, 1993. 
VI. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
ON THE ENTIRE JUDGMENT 
The trial court awarded Page Electric prejudgment interest at the legal rate from 
January 23, 1991 (the date Page Electric returned the damaged or defective ballasts to 
TEC) to the date of judgment. (R. 73). In Utah County v. Brown, Justice Hall wrote, 
"[a]n appeal does not stop the running of interest. To obtain such a result, the obligor 
must make a tender that is rejected by the obligee." 672 P.2d 83, 87 n.9 (Utah 1983), 
citing Woodmont. Inc. v. Daniel. 290 F.2d 186 (10th Cir. 1961). 
In December 1990, Glendon tendered three checks to Page Electric, totalling 
$18,067.80, which exceeded the total amount payable to Page Electric at that time. Page 
Electric rejected Glendon's tender by returning the uncashed checks on or about February 
6, 1991. 
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Under Utah law, prejudgment interest represents an amount 
awarded as damages due to the defendant's delay in 
tendering an amount clearly owing under an agreement or 
other obligation. 
Baker v. Data Phase. Inc.. 781 F. Supp. 724, 731 (D. Utah 1992) (emphasis added), 
citing L & A Drywall. Inc. v. Whitmore Constr. Co.. 608 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1980); 
Vasels v. Loguidice. 740 P.2d 1375, 1378 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In the instant case, 
Glendon did not delay tendering all amounts then due Page Electric. Accordingly, the 
trial court should not have awarded prejudgment interest on $18,067.80 of the total 
judgment. 
The trial court found that the endorsement provision on the reverse of three 
checks Glendon tendered to Page Electric justified rejection of the tender. Curiously, 
the court overlooked the fact that Jeanene S. Page endorsed and negotiated check number 
6388 dated November 21, 1990 which contained an identical provision. She even 
inserted a date above the endorsement and indicated full payment on invoice number 
3095. She could have qualified her endorsement on the other three checks as well. Page 
Electric's acceptance of partial payment through check number 6388 is inconsistent with 
the reasons given by Page Electric for rejection of Glendon's subsequent tenders. 
In its ruling, the trial court said "that Glendon Corporation made no effort to 
contact the plaintiffs from the plaintiffs statement, although there is a conflict in 
testimony, and to work out those payments and the release of lien provisions." (Tr. 328-
18 
329). Contrary to Utah law, the trial judge placed the burden of resolving the dispute 
over tender of payment squarely on Glendon. Utah Code Ann. Section 78-27-3 (1953) 
states: 
The person to whom a tender is made must, at the time, 
specify any objection he may have to the money, 
instrument or property, or he is deemed to have waived it; 
and, if the objection is to the amount of money, the terms 
of the instrument or the amount or kind of property, he 
must specify the amounts, terms or kind which he requires, 
or be precluded from objection afterwards. 
Page Electric did not specify any objection it had to Glendon's tender at the time 
it was made, in fact, nearly two months elapsed before the uncashed checks were 
returned with a note containing a dubious explanation. Thus, Page Electric waived any 
objection it had to Glendon's tender. See First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Maxwell. 
659 P.2d 1078, 1081-1082 (Utah 1983); Hansen v. Christenson. 545 P.2d 1152, 1154 
(Utah 1976); Ulibarri v. Christensen. 2 Utah 2d 367, 275 P.2d 170, 172 (1954). 
In Nielson v. O'Reilly. 200 Ut. Adv. Rep. 8, 11 (Utah 1992) the Utah Supreme 
Court affirmed the trial court's denial of plaintiff's claim for prejudgment interest in a 
first party insurance dispute over uninsured motorist coverage. Chief Justice Hall, 
writing for the court, noted that the plaintiff did not pursue a breach of contract claim 
against his insurance company. Rather, the proceedings were limited to establishing 
coverage under the policy. 
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In the instant case, Page Electric did not sue Ohio Casualty for breach of contract, 
but to recover under payment bonds issued in accordance with Utah Code Annotated 
Section 14-2-1 (1989). Paragraph 3 states: 
(3) The payment bond shall be with a surety or sureties 
satisfactory to the owner for the protection of all 
persons supplying labor, services, equipment or material 
in the prosecution of the work provided for in the contract 
in a sum equal to the contract price. 
(Emphasis added). Since the payment bonds in this case do not exceed the "contract 
price", Page Electric should not be allowed to recover additional sums as prejudgment 
interest. 
In his ruling, the trial judge said," [t]he Court finds that recovery in these kinds 
of cases is limited to the contract amount...." (Tr. 329). He knew this is an action to 
recover on payment bonds, yet he awarded prejudgment interest anyway. The award 
of prejudgment interest contradicts his finding that recovery is limited to the contract 
amount. 
B. THE CONTRACT BETWEEN GLENDON AND PAGE ELECTRIC 
WAS IN WRITING AND NOT AMBIGUOUS 
The trial judge's ruling that "there was never any written agreement between the 
plaintiffs and Glendon Corporation" (Tr. 323) was contrary to the evidence presented at 
trial. The subcontractor pre-qualification form was signed by Merlin Page, an owner of 
Page Electric. (DEx. 21). The pre-qualification form stated that Glendon's acceptance 
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of Page Electric's bid created a binding and enforceable contract of sale that included all 
of the provisions and specifications of the request for quotation, offer, acceptance (plans 
and specifications and site plans) and purchase order (subcontract). Thus, defendant's 
Exhibit 21 is a written contract executed by the party to be bound. 
The trial judge did acknowledge that the parties' agreement was evidenced by 
certain written documents and that the parties' relationship was governed by those 
documents. (Tr. 322, 323). 
If the contract is in writing and the language is not 
ambiguous, the intention of the parties must be determined 
from the words of the agreement. 
Winegar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991) citing Atlas Corp. v. Clovis 
Nat'l Bank. 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987); Oberhansly v. Earle. 572 P.2d 1384, 1386 
(Utah 1977). 
The trial court's ruling only mentioned one ambiguity in the contract. The court 
said the agreement was unclear about how change orders would occur. (Tr. 324). 
Instead of analyzing the contract and explaining why he thought it was ambiguous, the 
trial judge directed his attention to the parties, failures to use written change orders. 
Paragraph 6 of the subcontract (DEx. 11) explains the procedures for changes to the 
subcontract, and although not a model of clarity it is by no means ambiguous. 
Admittedly, Glendon and Page Electric did not comply with the requirements of 
subcontract paragraph 6, however, their failure to comply does not mean that the contract 
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was ambiguous. One could view the conduct of Page Electric and Glendon as simply a 
waiver of the written amendment component of paragraph 6. 
Where questions arise in the interpretation of an agreement, 
the first source of inquiry is within the document itself. It 
should be looked at ii* its entirety and in accordance with 
its purpose. All of its parts should be given effect insofar 
as that is possible. 
Regional Sales Agency. Inc. v. Reichert. 784 P.2d 1210, 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(quoting Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City. 740 P.2d 1357, 1359 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987)). "Language in a written document is ambiguous if the words used 
may be understood to support two or more plausible meanings." Jarman v. Reagan 
Outdoor Advertising. 749 P.2d 492, 494 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Whitehouse v. 
Whitehouse. 790 P.2d 57, 61, 62 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). The words in paragraph 6 do 
not support two or more plausible meanings. 
'The cardinal rule [of contract interpretation] is to give effect to the intentions of 
the parties, and if possible, to glean those intentions from the contract itself.' Home 
Sav. & Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.. 817 P.2d 341, 366-67 (Utah App. 1991). (citations 
omitted) (dissenting opinion of Judge Bench). 'In interpreting a contract, we determine 
what the parties intended by examining the entire contract and all of its parts in relation 
to each other, giving an objective and reasonable construction to the contract as a whole.' 
Id. (citations and emphasis omitted). "Courts may not view a subparagraph of a[n] 
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[insurance] policy in isolation to determine if it is ambiguous; all provisions of a policy 
must be interpreted together as one contract. Id. (citations omitted). 
C. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE STRICTLY APPLIED THE 
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES CLAUSE IN THE SUBCONTRACT 
Although the trial court believed that the change order provision of the 
subcontract between Glendon and Page Electric was unclear, no such claim was made 
about the liquidated damages provision. The prime contracts, plans and specifications, 
and subcontracts all contained liquidated damages provisions. The trial court found that 
Page Electric was given notice that liquidated damages would be imposed for delay to 
the job schedule. 
Since the agreement between Glendon and Page Electric was in writing and not 
ambiguous, the court should have strictly applied the liquidated damages provision and 
reduced the judgment accordingly. Instead, the court disallowed all liquidated damages 
assessed to Page Electric because, (1) the testimony at trial was uncontroverted that there 
were change orders on the Murray Au^ozone; and (2) the court could not discern whether 
Page Electric's delay resulted from work on change orders or work on the original 
contract. 
The trial court failed to consider that Glendon used the critical path method of 
scheduling the Autozone projects. Glendon also maintained current information about 
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change orders. It assessed liquidated damages to subcontractors based solely on their pro 
rata share of actual delay to the critical path schedule. (DEx. 9). 
A change order would have caused a corresponding extension of time to complete 
the project and would not have delayed the critical path schedule unless the work was on 
the critical path, and the subcontractor delayed completion of the change order beyond 
the extension. The notices of commencement attached to the prime contracts (DEx. 17, 
18, 19) are dated June 30, 1990 for the Bountiful Autozone and July 28, 1990 for the 
Murray Autozone. The completion dates were October 29, 1990 for Bountiful and 
December 3, 1990 for Murray. (Tr. 323). Autozone gave Glendon more than 65 calendar 
days on Bountiful and more than 80 calendar days on Murray before it began assessing 
liquidated damages. 
There were 20 delay days for which liquidated damages were assessed on the 
Murray Autozone. Yet, the period of July 28 to December 3 exceeds 100 calendar days. 
Autozone gave Glendon additional time to complete approved changes to the job 
schedule. 
The testimony of Steve Lefler (Tr. 248, 221-222) and defendant's Exhibit 9 show 
that Page Electric was scheduled on the critical path of the Murray Autozone project for 
9 days. Page Electric actually spent 21 days performing work that was on the critical 
path. There was no evidence presented at trial to support the trial judge's belief that one 
or more of the 21 days may have been spent working on change orders. 
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Where the parties have made an express contract, the court 
should not find a different one by 'implication concerning 
the same subject matter if the evidence does not justify 
[such] an inference . . ..' 
Ted R. Brown & Assoc, v. Carnes Corp., 753 P.2d 964, 970 (Utah App. 1988) 
(quoting, 3 Corbin on Contracts section 564 (I960)). "A court may not make a better 
contract for the parties than they have made for themselves; furthermore, a court may 
not enforce asserted rights not supported by the contract itself." IcL 
In Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert. 784 P.2d 1210 (Utah App. 1989), 
Regional sued Reichert for breach of a non-competition clause in Reichert's employment 
contract. The contract also contained a liquidated damages provision for breach of the 
non-competition clause. Reichert breached the non-competition clause but the jury only 
awarded Regional a nominal sum. On appeal, Regional challenged the trial court's jury 
instruction on liquidated damages which required Regional to prove that the liquidated 
damages provision was fair compensation for the breach and based on a reasonable 
relationship to actual damages. The Court of Appeals quoted the following "general 
rule" propounded in Young Elec. Sign Co. v. United Standard West. Inc.. 755 P.2d 162 
(Utah 1988): 
[A]s a general rule, parties to a contract may agree to 
liquidated damages in the case of a breach, and such 
agreements are enforceable if the amount of liquidated 
damages agreed to is not disproportionate to the possible 
compensatory damages and does not constitute a forfeiture 
or a penalty. Reasonable liquidated damage provisions 
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may reduce the cost of litigation by obviating the expense 
entailed in proving actual damages. If a liquidated 
damages provision is enforceable, a plaintiff need not prove 
actual damages. The burden is on the party who would 
avoid a liquidated damages provision to prove that no 
damages were suffered or that there is no reasonable 
relationship between compensatory and liquidated damages. 
In the instant case, ample evidence was presented at trial that Glendon was 
assessed liquidated damages by Autozone on the Murray store in the amount of 
$6,000.00. (DEx. 7, 8). Further, defendant's Exhibit 9 shows additional damages to 
Glendon in the amount of $4,000.00. Page Electric produced no evidence at trial that 
Glendon's damages were less, or that there was no reasonable relationship between 
compensatory and liquidated damages. Neither Page Electric nor the trial court claimed 
the amount of liquidated damages was a forfeiture or penalty. 
All other subcontractors on the Murray Autozone who delayed the critical path 
schedule were assessed their pro rata share of liquidated damages and additional 
damages. There was no evidence presented at trial that Glendon assessed Page Electric 
liquidated damages for performing work necessitated by change orders. However, even 
if part of the liquidated damages assessment was applied for delay caused by change 
orders, Page Electric would be entitled, at most, to a reduction of the liquidated damages 
assessment not the elimination of all liquidated damages. 
It is proper for a prime contractor to "pass on" to a 
subcontractor liquidated damages caused by the 
subcontractor. 
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Taos Const. Co. v. Penzel Const. Co.. 750 S.W. 2d 522, 527 (Mo. App. 1988). 
In Hoth v. White. 799 P.2d 213 (Utah App. 1990), a framing contractor 
foreclosed on a mechanic's lien it had filed against homeowners who counterclaimed 
disputing certain "extra" items or change orders and filed a third party complaint against 
the general contractor. The framing contractor claimed an unpaid balance of $2,500.00 
on the original framing contract of $6,000.00 plus an additional $1,410.00 for change 
orders. Many of the change orders requested by the homeowners were necessary to 
bring the residence into conformance with the specifications. The homeowners had given 
the specifications to the general contractor who failed to transmit them to the framing 
contractor. 
The trial court ordered the homeowners to pay the framing subcontractor 
$1,009.00 for change orders and the $2,500.00 balance on the original contract less an 
offset of $516.00 expended by the homeowners to complete the framing. The court 
ordered the general contractor to indemnify the homeowners for the full amount of the 
judgment. Furthermore, the trial court ordered the general contractor to pay that portion 
of the change orders not paid for by the homeowner. 
The contract between the homeowners and general contractor contained the 
following language, "no changes shall be made to the plans and specifications or the 
purchase price except as agreed to in a written change order signed by buyer and 
contractor which sets forth the change to be made in an amount of adjustment in the 
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purchase price required by said change." It was undisputed at trial that the parties signed 
no written change orders. 
Hoth is distinguishable because no change orders were caused by the 
incompetence of Glendon. Glendon gave Page Electric notice of, and access to, the 
plans and specifications, site plans, prime contract, subcontract, and in short, all 
information necessary to complete the electrical work on the Autozones. Significantly, 
the trial court in Hoth focused on the parties' written and unambiguous contract and 
strictly applied its provisions in requiring the general contractor to pay for change orders. 
Likewise, in the instant case, the trial court should have strictly applied the liquidated 
damages provision contained in the contract documents. 
D. THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF 
LAW TO SUPPORT THE AMOUNT OF JUDGMENT AND THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS WERE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
The trial court awarded Page Electric $338.47 on the Murray and Orem 
Autozones, or a total of $676.94, to repair damaged or defective lighting. The only 
evidence that can be marshalled in support of the trial court's finding on this point is the 
erroneous testimony of Kelly Page. He testified that he hauled his ladder into the 
Murray Autozone, took the old ballasts out of the lamps and inserted the new ballasts. 
He did the same for the Orem store. According to Kelly Page, the charge of $338.47 
per store was for labor performed in replacing the ballasts. Kelly Page's testimony is 
inconsistent with that of his brother, Kevin Page. 
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The figure $338.4? first surfaced in Glendon's memorandum to Page Electric of 
January Id I!" ""Mil I I '"II ' I I in Meu j I el lei si ale ill in III in meiiiniamlum thai uilo/one 
was charging Glendon $338.47 per buildine on the Murra\ and Oreir Autozones because 
j 
defective ballasts had i lot been returne^ ,. . . . . . J . JLC :C^\K ided to 
Glendon's memorandum on January M ' g g *. ^ «^4ju;v- i\ ^ •!.*:• i^ e* i*~ 
defective ballasts had been returned to * Lv. uney were returned that d a \ , an j a. >o raised 
the point that Page Electric had never been paid for "handling and installation" costs. 
She said an invoice for these costs were included with her response V H?J. unwever, 
Page Electi ic ::li ::l i IC t pi odi ice a c :>:i i z\ n i ei it in IV oice 01 : till lei d :) " i ; -\ .- .rf. vec of a 
charge for replacement of the damaged or defective lighting ballasts. 1 LC sen: a cneck 
for $33 Il 5 : i it h i: n lai ;; 29, 1991 tc ew • ei Page's postage costs. 
Page Electric did not provide written notice to Glendon of the $338.47 change 
( . 
tune. Kevin P.- «-:endea a meeting ,\:;:_ representatives o: Glencie: w discuss 
settlement. - meeting, Licwcon s representatives presented a document showing 
various negative change orders including the two $338.47 charges. Glendon wanted to 
"pass on" these charges to Page Electric k>r ;^<u*re to return the damaged or defective 
ballasts. Kevin Page presented evidence that the ballasts had been returned. (DEx. 20). 
He then recorded a positive change order of $338.47 on the Murray and Orem. Autozones 
appeal occurred when Glendon's negative change orders were never incorporated into 
Page Electric's July, 1991 billing statement or the figures used by the trial judge to 
calculate the total judgment. Instead, the two $338.47 charges were mistakenly identified 
on the billing statement as installation costs. 
$338.47 was not a reasonable charge for replacing five (DEx. 20) defective or 
damaged ballasts. The fact that the amount charged to replace the ballasts is identical 
to the cost of the ballasts suggests a mistake was made. TEC supplied the lights and 
shipped directly to Page Electric. TEC paid for the shipping costs to return the defective 
or damaged ballasts. Page Electric should have also looked to TEC for reimbursement 
of any installation costs. 
See VI. C , supra, for Appellant's argument that the judgment should have been 
reduced by the amount of damages Glendon assessed to Page Electric. 
E. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING CLOSING ARGUMENT 
AND ORAL ARGUMENT ON OHIO CASUALTY'S POST-TRIAL 
MOTION 
In DeJohn v. American Estate Life Insurance Company. 489 P.2d 1065 (Colo. 
App. 1971), the appellant/defendant asserted error by the trial court in refusing to permit 
closing argument. Appellant contended that its legal argument might have swayed the 
court's opinion. The Colorado Court of Appeals held against the appellant on this issue 
because: 
Defendant was not denied the right to give the trial 
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court the benefit of its thinking on the legal theories 
involved since such arguments were properly presented in 
the motion for new trial and were rejected by the trial court, 
Id. at i w < . 
In the instant case, the trial court not only prohibited closing argument but also 
disregarded, without explanation, Ohio Casualty's request for oiai -Lament on its 
Motion to Amend Findings and Judgment or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial. Utah 
Code of Ji idi :ial \ di i lii listratioi i Ri lie 4 501(3)(b). (c) & (d) states: 
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion would 
dispose of the action or any issues in the action 
on the merits with prejudice, either party at the 
time of filing the principal memorandum in support 
of or in opposition to a motion may file a written 
request for a hearing. 
(c) Such request shall be grantcu urn. - inc eoui; finds 
that (a) the motion or opposition \o the motion is 
frivolous or lb) thai the dispositiu- issue or set of 
issues governing the granting or denial of the motion 
has been ai ith>r * • i 'v . .u i . 
(d) When a request tor hearing is denied, the court 
shall notify the requesting party.... 
(Emphasis added). If granted, Ohio Casualty's motioii to amend the findings and 
judgment would have disposed of the case on the merits with prejudice. Yet, the court 
failed to grai it tl ic reqi lest foi oral ai gi m :i itei it. failed to i i la ke findings that the motion was 
frivolous or the issues authoritatively decided, and failed to notify Ohio Casualty. 
The need for oral argument was underscored by the trial court's non-responsive 
ruling of January 18, 1993 (R. 101-102). Insufficiency of the evidence was only one of 
several issues raised in Ohio Casualty's post-trial motion and memorandum. The trial 
court failed to consider or ignored the other issues. Ohio Casualty never raised an issue 
about the adequacy of time to present its case. The trial court's ruling on this point was 




Ohio Casualty respectfully requests this Court to reverse the judgment and remand 
the case to the trial court with instructions to amend its findings and judgment as follows: 
a) Eliminate the award of prejudgment interest; 
b) Reduce the judgment by $1,263.16, the amount of liquidated and additional 
damages Glendon assessed to Page Electric; and 
c) Delete the awards of $338.47 per building on the Murray and Orem 
Autozones for replacing damaged or defective lighting. 
In the alternative, Ohio Casualty respectfully requests the court to reverse and 
remand for a new trial due to insufficiency of the evidence to support the amount of 
judgment and/or error in law. The Court should instruct the trial court to allow oral 
argument if properly requested. 
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Dated this day of August, 1993. 
Ronald E. Griffin 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF were mailed, postage prepaid, on August , 1993, to: 
George K. Fadel 
170 West 400 South 




A. Utah Code Ann. Section 78-27-3 (1953). 
B. Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501 (3)(b), (c) & (d). 
C. Utah Code Ann. Section 14-2-1 (1989). 
D. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated August 5, 1992. 
E. Defendant's Exhibit 21, Subcontractor Prequalification Form. 
F. Defendant's Exhibit 11, Subcontract Agreement. 
G. Defendant's Exhibits 7, 8, and 9, Change Authorization and Change Order 
Summary showing Autozone's assessment of Liquidated damages to Glendon and 
Summary of Glendon's assessment of damages to subcontractors. 
H. Plaintiffs Exhibit 14, Steve Lefler's memorandum of January 16, 1991 
and Jeanene Page's response of January 23, 1991. 
I. Judge Page's Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Amend Findings and 
Judgement, or in the Alternative, For a New Trial dated January 18, 1993. 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
78-27-3. Objection to tender — Must be specified or 
deemed waived. 
The person to whom a tender is made must, at the time, specify any objec-
tion he may have to the money, instrument or property, or he is deemed to 
have waived it; and, if the objection is to the amount of money, the terms of 
the instrument or the amount or kind of property, he must specify the 




(b) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action 
or any issues m the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at 
the time of filing the principal memorandum in support of or m opposition 
to a motion may file a wntten request for a hearing 
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the 
motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive 
issue or set of issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has 
been authoritatively decided 
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the 
requesting party When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall 
set the matter for hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter 
shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for 
hearing and notify all parties of the date and time 
ADDENDUM "C 
14-2-1. Definitions — Payment bond required — Right of 
action — Notice — Attorneys ' fees. 
(1) For purposes of this chapter: 
(a) "Contractor" means any person who is or may be awarded a con-
tract for the construction, alteration, or repair of any building, structure, 
or improvement upon land. 
(b) "Owner'' means any person contracting for construction, alteration, 
or repair of any building, structure, or improvement upon land. 
(2) Before any contract exceeding $2,000 in amount for the construction, 
alteration, or repair of any building, structure, or improvement upon land is 
awarded to any contractor, the owner shall obtain from the contractor a pay-
ment bond complying with Subsection (3). The bond shall become binding 
upon the award of the contract to the contractor. 
(3) The payment bond shall be with a surety or sureties satisfactory to the 
owner for the protection of all persons supplying labor, services, equipment, or 
material in the prosecution of the work provided for in the contract in a sum 
equal to the contract price. 
(4) A person shall have a right of action on a payment bond under this 
chapter for any unpaid amount due him if: 
(a) he has furnished labor, services, equipment, or material in the pros-
ecution of the work provided for in the contract for which the payment 
bond is furnished under this chapter; and 
(b) he has not been paid in full within 90 days after the last day on 
which he performed the labor or service or supplied the equipment or 
material for which the claim is made. 
(5) An action under this section shall be brought in a court of competent 
jurisdiction in the county where the contract was to be performed and not 
elsewhere. The action is barred if not commenced wTithin one year after the 
last day on which the claimant performed the labor or service or supplied the 
equipment or material on which the claim is based. The obligee named in the 
bond need not be joined as a party to the action. In any action upon a bond, the 
court may award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party, which fees 
shall be taxed as costs in the action. 
(6) The payment bond shall be exhibited to any interested person upon 
request. 
(7) In any suit upon a payment bond under this chapter, the court shall 
award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. 
ADDENDUM "D" 
FILED V> o-,-, ^: 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




THE OHIO CASUALTY GROUP OF 
INSURANCE COMPANIES, a corporation, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
I CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Civil No. 910750974 CV 
Judge Page 
The above entitled cause came on regularly for trial before 
the above entitled Court, the Honorable Rodney S. Page, District 
Judge, presiding on Monday, June 8th, 1992 and continued on 
Wednesday, June 10th, 1992. The plaintiffs appeared by Kevin Page, 
Kay Page and Kelley Page, together with their attorney, George K. 
Fadel. The defendant appeared by Attorney Ronald E. Griffin. The 
Court heard testimony and considered all evidence, and being fully 
advised in the matter, now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff is a corporation of the State of Utah with its 
principal place of business at 353 North Main Street, North Salt 
Lake, Utah. 
G E O R G E K. F A D E L 
A T T O R N E Y F O R # 1 0 2 7 
ITO « « F o ; ; » ™ f o i ' T * l a i n t i f f 
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2. Defendant is a corporation doing business as an insurance 
and bonding company in the State of Utah with an office at 7050 
Union Park Avenue, Suite 350, Midvale, Utah. 
3. The Glendon Corporation which acted as a general 
contractor for construction of buildings for AUTOZONE, INC. has its 
principal office at 450 East 1000 North, North Salt Lake, Utah, and 
contracted to construct buildings for Autozone in Davis County, 
Salt Lake County and Utah County, State of Utah. 
4. Glendon Corporation contracted in Davis County, Utah with 
plaintiff to provide certain labor and materials for electrical 
facilities in the buildings in each of said three counties. 
5. In each of the buildings in said three counties, Autozone 
as owner contracted with Glendon for construction thereof for 
amounts exceeding $2,000.00 and the owner, Autozone, obtained from 
the contractor, Glendon, a payment bond for the protection of all 
persons supplying labor, services equipment or material in the 
prosecution of the work provided in the contracts equal to the 
contract price. 
6. The defendant contracted as surety and provided the 
payment bond pursuant to the requirements of 14-2-1 Utah Code 
Annotated. 
7. In reliance upon the contract of Glendon and the payment 
bond of the defendant, the plaintiff supplied labor and materials 
in the construction of the buildings in each of said three 
counties. 
8. Glendon built basically two sizes of stores for Autozone, 
3 
a smaller store which was typical of the store built in Bountiful, 
Utah, and a larger store which was typical of the stores built in 
Orem and Murray, Utah. Glendon requested plaintiffs to bid the 
electrical labor and materials other than equipment and fixtures 
for the three jobs. The plaintiff and defendant were neighboring 
companies which had both conducted business in the area. 
Plaintiffs had available to them the site plans and specifications 
at Glendon's plan room for the jobs in question. Plaintiff's 
representative looked at the plans at Glendon's office and 
submitted bids from said plans for the Bountiful, Murray and Orem 
stores. The bid documents consists of the actual plans, the site 
plans and any addendums which are a part of those plans, and the 
bids of the plaintiff are governed by those bid documents. The 
plaintiff's bids for the stores were $7,190.00 as a basic bid for 
the Bountiful store, and $9,420.00 was the basic bid tor each of 
the Murray and Orem stores. Glendon received the said bids and 
responded that the plaintiff company had been the low bidders. 
Subsequently, a review of the jobs was conducted by Glendon at a 
meeting at which plaintiff's representative was present with other 
subcontractors and a discussion followed relating to bid documents 
and somewhat the procedures to be followed in connection with the 
change orders. All parties contemplated that there would be some 
change orders during the course of construction. 
9. Glendon commenced construction on the three Autozone 
stores for which they were successful bidder. Wherein the 
plaintiff supplied the first labor and materials on the Bountiful 
4 
store on August 30, 1990, and the last work on October 29, 1990. 
The first work on the Murray store was September 5, 1990, and the 
last work thereon was December 4, 1990, It was the agreement of 
the parties that progress payments would be made as those payments 
were received by the Glendon Corporation. The three jobs were 
substantially completed by the early part of December, although the 
Bountiful store was substantially completed by October 29th so far 
as the plaintiff was concerned. 
10. During the course of construction, certain changes were 
made although neither Glendon nor the plaintiff followed the 
procedures set forth in the proposed construction contained in the 
subcontract or the prime contract. The parties have admitted 
certain change orders although not accomplished by contract 
documents. There was never any written agreement between plaintiff 
and Glendon Corporation. However, it is clear that these parties 
had a meeting of the minds at least as to the basic contract price 
and what was to be paid in that regard and they further agreed that 
there would be changes and that those changes would be expected to 
be carried out by the plaintiff although it is not clear what the 
agreement was between the parties on how the change orders were to 
be conducted. There is no question that there was never any 
written direction by Glendon to plaintiff to complete any change 
order nor that plaintiff ever submitted a written request on a 
change order. At least two change orders were admitted by the 
parties, being the change in the parking lot lighting at the Murray 
store and the addition of the roof top units at the Murray and Orem 
5 
stores. Many items sought by plaintiff as change orders were in 
fact part of the contract documents and somehow overlooked by 
plaintiff. The heat tapes were to have been included by the 
contract documents. On the Murray store the parking lot lighting 
was contemplated by all parties as an addition and the reasonable 
value thereof is $1,380.00 however a reduction of $316.00 is 
allowed thereon because plaintiff did not complete the addition. 
The extra roof top unit, and the rerouting of the power to the sign 
as a result of placing of the curbing by the contractor was also 
properly charged as extras approved by Glendon if not the parent 
company, Autozone. Under the contract documents Autozone was to 
furnish certain fixtures including lighting fixtures and the extra 
charge in replacing the defective fixtures is a proper additional 
charge for the Murray store of $338.00. Glendon was required to 
expend $143.00 for an improperly installed light and $891.30 for 
the heating tape. 
Regarding the Orem store, the charges of the plaintiff of 
$670.00 for the extra roof top unit, and repairs to the defective 
lighting charged at $338.47 are proper extra charges, subject to 
a deduction of $891.30 for the heat tape. 
A summary of charges and credits on the three stores is as 
follows: 
Bountiful Store: 
Reasonable Value of performance of bid $7,190.00 




Reasonable value of performance of bid $9,420,00 
Power to yard lights $1,380.00 less $316.00 1,064.00 
Extra roof top unit 670.00 
Rerouting conduit to sign 153.00 
Repairs to defective lighting 338.47 
Less credit to Glendon: 
Heating tape $891.30 
Improper light installation $143.00 





Reasonable value of performance of bid $9,420.00 
Extra roof top unit 670.00 
Repairs to defective lighting 338.47 
$10,428.47 
Less credit to Glendon: 
Heating tape $891.30 
Uncompleted work $215.00 -1,106.30 
Net $9,322.17 
Total amount due Plaintiff: $25,935.04 
11. The plaintiff has not been paid any amount other than 
reimbursement for the temporary power. The part payment by checks 
reciting payment in full were properly refused by the plaintiff, 
and the lien waivers were without consideration and of no effect. 
12. The Court finds that the defendant surety agreed to 
indemnify and pay over on behalf of Glendon any sums due and owing 
pursuant to the contracts which were not paid by Glendon but not 
exceeding the contract amounts. The Court finds that the additions 
agreed to by the parties are included as contracted amounts. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court makes the 
7 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the 
defendant for the sum of $25,935.04 together with prejudgment 
interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from January 
23, 1991. 
2. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment for a reasonable 
attorney's fee as set forth in the revised affidavit of plaintiff's 
attorney in the sura of $4,140.00. 
3. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment for costs. 
Dated this 5 ^ day of August, 1992. 
BY THE COURT 
TRUDGE O DISTRIC  JUD
Approved As To Form: 
Ronald E. Gr:u£fin r ' 
ADDENDUM "E" 
GLEND0N CORPORATION VENDOR ft 
GENERAL CONTRACTORS 
450 EAST 1000 NORTH 
THIRD FLOOR 
NORTH SALT LAKE, UT 
84054 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * i * * * * . ^ 
SUBCONTRACTOR PRE-QUAL1FICATI0N FORM 
******************************************** *** ****** *******;* *** * «*;+ ** ********** 
AIA DIVISION tt: in TYPE OF WORK:
 P 1 P r M r a i mni-rart-nr 
RESIDENTIAL: (YgS^ NO selective/ 
COMMERCIAL: rttiS)/ NO 
COMPANY NAME- P A G E E L E C T R I C SERVICE, INC. 
n r_ 353 North Main ADDRESS: 
CITY: Nnrrh Salt Xake STATE Litah Z1P CODE:_MQ5.^ 
OFFICE PHONE: 292-2071 HOME PHONE: ?Q?-iQ8S 
SALESMAN NAME: N/A reps, will he Merlin, Kevin or KPII y P a g P 
STATE OF UTAH LICENSE NUMBER: 1 5S04-S . 
CITY OR COUNTY LICENSE NUMBER: n ^ st-at-p rPfPrpnrP n'iph°r 
CORPORATION: (YES// NO PARTNERSHIP: YES / NO PROPRIETORSHIP: YES / NO 
(Please list individuals of either type below) 
Jeanene S. Page, Pres. Merlin W. Page, V.P. Kelly D. Page, V.P. 
James Kevin Page, Sec/Treasurer 
FEDERAL IDENTIFICATION NO. 87-O^nSfiSn OR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 
other policies are cover through Full Service Agency of S.L. C. 
LIABILITY CARRIER: gfat.p T n g l, r g n r g F n n H POLICY tf: P??97 
ADDRESS: CITY: STATE: ZIP: 





 pH0Hg C0HTACT W0RK DONE 
tfl Raymond Const. 752-2911 Dave Watts BAVC/Logan 
n KHAL Bids. Steve or Roger Taco Bell 
13 Pepsi-Cola 972-2732 Ed Hutto Pepsi 
SUBCONTRACTOR HEARBY AGREES TO THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS: 
1. PREPARATION OF BIDS: (a) Failure to examine any drawings, specifications and instructions will 
be at bidder's risk. 
(b) All prices and notations must be printed in ink or typewritten. No erasures permitted. Errors 
Bay be crossed out and corrections printed in ink or typewritten adjacent and must be initialed in 
ink by person signing bid. 
(c) Price each item separately. Unit price shall be shown and a total price shall be entered for 
each item bid on. 
(d) Brand names and numbers when given are for reference. 
(e) Tine of delivery is part of the bid and must be adhered to. 
2. SUBMISSION OF BID: (a) Bids must be signed in ink and bidders ' name on outside of envelope. 
(b) Bids and modifications or corrections thereof received after the closing time specified will not 
be considered. 
(c) No charge for delivery, drayage, express, parcel post, packing, cartage, insurance license fees, 
permits, cost of bonds, or for any other purpose will be paid by Glendon Corporation unless expressly 
included and itemized in the bid. 
3. BONDS: Glendon Corporation reserves the right to require from the vendor a bid bond, a supply 
contract bond, a performance bond and a payment bond in an amount or amounts meeting the legal 
requirements thereof. 
L AJfARD OF CONTRACT: (a) Contracts and purchases will be made or entered into with the 
responsible bidder making the lowest and or best bid meeting specifications subject to Glendon 
Corporations right of rejection of any or all bids. 
(b) Unless the bidder has specified otherwise in this bid Glendon Homes Construction may accept any 
item or group of items of any kind. 
(c) Glendon Corporation reserves the right to reject any or all bids and waive any informality or 
technicality in bids received in the interest of Glendon Corporation. 
(d) The acceptance by Glendon Corporation for this quotation shall create a binding and enforceable 
Contract of Sale, dating from the time of said acceptance, without any further action by either party 
and even though a written purchase order has not been furnished to or received by the successful 
bidder. Said created Contract of Sale shall include all of the provisions and specifications of the 
request for quotation, offer, acceptance and purchase order relating thereto. Said contract shall be 
interpreted, construed and given effect in all respects according to the laws of the State of Utah 
and the Ordinances of local building authority and shall not be assignable by the vendor in whole or 
in part without the written consent of Glendon Corporation. 
5. SAMPLES: Samples of items, when required, must be furnished free of expense to Glendon 
Corporation and if not destroyed by test, may upon request made at the time the sample is furnished, 
be returned at the bidders expense. 
6. FAILURE TO BID: Failure to bid or to advise Glendon Corporation that future requests for 
quotations are desired may result in the removal of the vendor's name from the bidder's list. 
7 WARRANTY The bidder expressly warrants that the merchandise will conform to its description 
and any applicable specifications, shall be of good mercnantabl* quality and fit for the known 
purpose for which it is sold This warranty is m addition to a*y standard wi^ranty or service 
guarantee given by the bidder to a purchaser 
8 CONDITION Checks will not be released unless proof of acti/e memoership in Worker s 
Compensation Fund of Utah and Liability Insurance, in the torm of a Certificate of Insurance is m 
our files, also, to be included is a W-9 Form If t m s msuiance is allowed to lapse, checks will b^ 
held until confirmation of reinstatement is received by our office 
MHcte** 
Due to regulations made bv Workers Compensation of Utah, we are no longer able to reauest 
veritication to current payments made to Workers Compensation This verification must now cose from 
the suocontractor personally 
We need to receive this information within 10 days following your receipt ot this torm It we have 
not received verification m the above stated time, we will assume the^e is no coverage and will 
deduct the appropriate amount from any pa/cents to be made to you and will credit them to Workers 
Compensation 
To request the certificate of verification, call 533-8020 and give them your Policy Number You can 
have them send it directly to us at Glendon Corporation - 450 East 1000 Nor+h Suite 201, North Salt 
Lake, Utah 84054 




THIS AGREEMENT made at SALT LAKE CITY
 U u h ) t h u 20TH day of 
JUNE 90
 t L GLENDON CORPORATION 
, 19 , by and between 
of , hereinafter referred to as the Contractor, and 
VIC?. EI.PfTOTP 
CONTRACT* 90Q8-160Q0S 
hereinafter referred to as the Subcontractor We bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns 
jointly and severally firmly by these presents 
WITNESSETH That for and in consideration of the covenants herein contained, the Contractor and the Subcontractor 
agree as follows 
1. SCOPE OF WORK 
That the work to be performed by the Subcontractor under the terms of this agreement consist* of the following-
Furnishing of all labor and material, tools, implements, and equipment, scaffolding, permits, fees, etc., to do all of the 
following 
FURNISH AMD INSTALL (ELECTRICAL) AS PEE PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING 
SECTIONS IN THE DRAWINGS: (A0.1 - A0.6) (A.1A - A.1D) ( A . l - A.8) ( S . l - S . 5 ) (HP. l - HP.6) ( E . l - K.6) ( P . l -
P . 4 ) ( S N . l - SH.2) IT IS THE INTENT OF THIS CONTRACT TO COVER ALL OF (YOUR) WORK TEAT IS IN THE ABOVE SECTIONS. 
ALL WORK IS TO BE COMPLETED AS DIRECTED BY AND ACCORDING TO THE SCHEDULE OF THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR. TIME IS OF 
THE ESSENCE. WE AS CONTRACTOR AND SUBCONTRACTORS MUST ADHERE TO THE JOB SCHEDULE THAT WILL BECOME ATTACHMENT 
HBn OF THIS CONTRACT. 
ATTACHMENT "A" IS A PART OF THIS CONTRACT. A CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE WILL BE IN OUR CORPORATE OFFICE AND ALSO IN 
OUR JOB TRAILER ON THE CONSTRUCTION SITE. IT WILL BECOME ATTACHMENT "B" OF THIS CONTRACT. 
When the Subcontractor does not install all material furnished under this Subcontract such material as is not installed 
is to be delivered F O B JOBSITE 
L u , J , AUTOZONE DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION in strict accordance with the plans and specifications as prepared by 
t AUTOZONE BOUNTIFUL 
Architect and/or Engineer, for the construction of 
For AUTOZONE 
Owner. 
for which construction the Contractor has the prime contract with the Owner, together with all addenda or authonzed 
changes issued prior to the date of execution of this agreement 
The Contractor and the Subcontractor agree to be bound by the terms of the prime contract agreement, construct on 
regulations, general conditions, plans and specifications, and any and all other contract documents, if any there be, insofar 
as applicable to this subcontract agreement, and to that portion of the work herein described to be performed by the Subcon 
tractor t ADDENDUMS | 1 AND I 2 
In the event of any doubt or question arising between the Contractor and the Subcontractor with respect to the plans 
and specifications the decision of the Architect and/or Engineer shall be conclusive and binding Should there be no super-
vising architect over the work, then the matter in question shall be determined as provided in Section 7 of the agreement 
DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT 
Co r n u o c v ^ u u u i M u r wwv^nrv, U C L M T O , t i w . 
The Subcontractor shall prosecute the work undertaken in a prompt and diligent manner whenever such 
part of it, becomes available, or at such other time or times as the Contractor may direct, and so as to promot ^ ^ ^ ^ W 
progress of the entire construction, and shall not, by delay or otherwise, interfere with or hinder the work of the C ***$$l 
or any other Subcontractor, and in the event that the Subcontractor neglects and/or fails to supply the nee ° a t r * * ^ 
and/or materials, tools, implements, equipment, etc., in the opinion of the Contractor, then the Contractor shall ^ i 4 ^ r 
Subcontractor in writing setting forth the deficiency and/or delinquency, and five days after date of ^uch written n r ' ^ **** 
Contractor shall have the right if he so desires to take over the work of the Subcontractor in full, and exclude the S ^ ' **** 
tractor from any further participation in the work covered by this agreement; or, at his option the Contractor ma C°1? 
over such portion of the Subcontractor's work as the Contractor shall deem to be in the best interest of the Contracto 
permit the Subcontractor to continue with the remaining portions of the work. Whichever method the Contractor might' I ^ 
to pursue, the Subcontractor agrees to release to the Contractor, for his use only, without recourse, any materials to 
implements, equipment, etc., on the site, belonging to or in the possession of the Subcontractor, for the benefit of the C 
tractor, in completing the work covered in this agreement; and, the Contractor agrees to complete the work to the best 
his ability and in the most economical manner available to him at the time. Any costs incurred by the Contractor in dom 
any such portion of the work covered by this agreement shall be charged against any monies due or to become due under th 
terms of this agreement, and in the event the total amount due or to become due under the terms of this agreement shall b 
insufficient to cover the costs accrued by the Contractor in completing the work, then the Subcontractor and his sureties i 
any, shall be bound and liable unto the Contractor for the difference. 
Should the proper workmanlike and accurate performance of any work under this contract depend wholly or partiall 
upon the proper workmanlike or accurate performance of any work or materials furnished by the Contractor or other subcot 
tractors on the project, the Subcontractor agrees to use all means necessary to discover any such defects and report same i 
writing to the Contractor before proceeding with his work which is so dependent; and shall allow to the Contractor a reasoi 
able time in which to remedy such defects; and in the event he does not so report to the Contractor in writing, then it sha 
be assumed that the Subcontractor has fully accepted the work of others as being satisfactory and he shall be fully respo 
sible thereafter for the satisfactory performance of the work covered by this agreement, regardless of the defective work c 
others. 
The Subcontractor shall clean up and remove from the site as directed by the Contractor, all rubbish and debris r 
suiting from his work. Failure to clean up rubbish and debris shall serve as cause for withholding further payment to Sub-
contractor until such time as this condition is corrected to the satisfaction of the Contractor. Also he shall clean up to the 
satisfaction of the inspectors, all dirt, grease marks, etc., from walls, ceilings, floors, fixtures, etc., deposited or placed thereon 
as a result of the execution of this subcontract. If the Subcontractor refuses or fails to perform this cleaning as directed by 
the Contractor, the Contractor shall have the right and power to proceed with the said cleaning, and the Subcontractor will 
on demand repay to the Contractor the actual cost of said labor plus a reasonable percentage of such cost to cover super-
vision, insurance, overhead, etc. 
The Subcontractor agrees to reimburse the Contractor for any and all liquidated damages that may be assessed against 
and collected from the Contractor by the Owner, which are attributable to or caused by the Subcontractor's failure to 
furnish the materials and perform the work required by this Subcontract within the time fixed in the manner provided for 
herein, and in addition thereto, agrees to pay to the Contractor such other or additional damages as the Contractor may 
sustain by reason of such delay by the Subcontractor. The payment of such damages shall not release the Subcontractor 
from his obligation to otherwise fully perform this Subcontract. 
Whenever it may be useful or necessary to the Contractor to do so, the Contractor shall be permitted to occupy and/or 
use any portion of the work which has been either partially or fully completed by the Subcontractor before final inspection 
and acceptance thereof by the Owner, but such use and/or occupation shall not relieve the Subcontractor of his guarantee of 
said work and materials nor of his obligation to make good at his own expense any defect in materials and workmanship which 
may occur or develop prior to Contractor's release from responsibility to the Owner. Provided, however, the Subcontractor 
shall not be responsible for the maintenance of such portion of the work as may be used and/or occupied by the Contractor, 
nor for any damage thereto that is due to or caused by the sole negligence of the Contractor during such period of use. 
Subcontractor shall be responsible for his own work, property and/or materials until completion and final acceptance of 
the Contract by the Owner, and shall bear the risk of any loss or damage until such acceptance and shall pay promptly for 
all materials and labor furnished to the project. In the event of loss or damage, he shall proceed promptly to make repairs, or 
replacement of the damaged work, property and/or materials at his own expense, as directed by the Contractor/Subcon-
tractor waives all rights Subcontractor might have against Owner and Contractor for loss or damage to Subcontractor's work, 
property or materials. 
It is agreed that the Subcontractor, at the option of the Contractor, may be considered as disabled from so complying 
whenever a petition in Bankruptcy or for the appointment of a Receiver is filed against him. 
The Subcontractor assumes toward the Contractor all the obligations and responsibilities that the Contractor assumes 
toward the Owner. The Subcontractor shall indemnify the Contractor and the Owner against, and save them harmless from, 
any and all loss, damage, expenses, costs, and attorneys' fees incurred or suffered on account of any breach of the provisions 
or covenants of this contract. 
Subcontractor agrees to fully comply with the Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970 and any and all regulations 
issued pursuant thereto. Subcontractor as a term and condition of this subcontract shall keep and save the contractor harmless 
from any claims or charges of any kind by reason of subcontractor failing to fully comply with the act and regulations and 
agrees to reimburse the contractor for any fines, damages, or expenses of any kind incurred by the contractor by reason of 
the subcontractor's failure to comply. 
Ol trie WOTK. t u v e r e u uy wns, d ^ r e e m e n t m e u u n u is .u u»r « M . I . C i uv J 3ukc-,y v.vjiupu*i* u c a i g u d i e u u r a p p r o v e d o> .n»; v .uu 
tractor, and in a form entirely satisfactory to the Contractor 
4. PERMITS, LICENSES, FEES, TAXES, ETC. 
The Subcontractor shall, at his own cost and expense JODK '"or and obtain all necessary permits and licensps and -.hall 
conform strictly to the laws and ordinances in force in the local'ty <vhere the work under the project is being done, insofar 
as applicable to work covered by this agreement The Subcontractor aha'l hold harmless the prime Contractor against haoility 
by reason of the Subcontractor having failed to pay federal
 3tate courty or mun cipal taxes 
5. INSURANCE 
The Subcontractor agrees to provide and maintain .vor^mena compensation insurance and to comply in all respect 
with the employment and payment of labor required b> an> constituted authority having legal jurisdiction over the area in 
which the work is performed. 
The Subcontractor agrees to carry comprehensive public liability and property damage insurance, and such other 
insurance as the Contractor might deem necessary in amounts as approved by the Contractor, in order to protect the Con-
tractor and Subcontractor against loss resulting from any acts of the Subcontractor, his agents, and/or employees Such 
insurance shall not be less than limits and coverages required in the general contract documents. 
The Subcontractor agrees to furnish evidence satisfactory to the Contractor, of such insurance, including copies of the 
policies, when requested to do so by the Contractor 
All insurance required hereunder shall be maintained in full force and effect in a company or companies satisfactory 
to Contractor, shall be maintained at Subcontractor s expense until performance in full hereof (certificates of such insurance 
being supplied by Subcontractor to Contractor), and such insurance shall be subject to requirement that Contractor must be 
notified by ten (10) days' written notice before cancellation of any such policy In event of threatened cancellation for non-
payment of premium, Contractor may pay same 'or Subcontractor and deduct the said payment from amounts tnen or sub-
sequently owing to Subcontractor hereunder 
6. CHANGES, ADDITIONS AND DEDUCTIONS 
The Contractor may add to or deduct f«-om the amount oi *vork covered by this agreement, and any changes made in 
the amount of work involved, or any other parts ot this agreement, ->hall be by a written amendment hereto setting forth in 
detail the changes involved and the value thereof which shail be mutually agreed upon between the Contractor and the Sub-
contractor if such be possible, and if such mutual agreement 's not posa.ble then the value of the work shall be determined as 
provided in Section 7 of this agreement In either event however the Subcontractor agrees to proceed with the work as 
changed when so ordered in writing by the Contractor so as not fj delay the progress of the work, and pending any determi 
nation of the value thereof 
The Subcontractor agrees to make no claim for additional worK outside the scope of this contract unless terms hereof 
shall be conclusive with respect of this agreement between the parties hereto. Claims for any extras shall be made within one 
week from date of completion 
The Subcontractor shall not sublet, transfer or assign this agreement or any funds due or to become due or any part 
thereof without the written consent of the Contractor. 
7. DISPUTES 
In the event of any dispute between the Contractor and Subcontractor covering the scope of the work, the dispute 
shall be settled in the manner provided by the contract documents If none be provided, or if there arises any dispute con-
cerning matters in connection with this agreement, and without the scope of the work, then such disputes shall be settled by 
a ruling of a board of arbitration consisting of three members, one selected by the Contractor, one by the Subcontractor and 
the third member shall be selected by the first two members The Contractor and Subcontractor shall bear the expense of 
their selected members respectively, but the expenses of the third member shall be borne by the party hereto requesting the 
arbitration in writing 
The Contractor and Subcontractor agree to be bound by the findings of any such board* of arbitration, finally and 
without recourse to any court of law. 
e t SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINTY DOLLAR-
i m 01 — — 
in mon th ly payments of £0
 % o f t h e w o r k pe r fo rmed in a n y 0 ^ | i e / 4 j M f f P A f h 
prepared by the Subcont rac tor and as approved by the Con t r ac to r and . 
. , such p a y m e n t s to be made as payments are received by the Cont rac tor from t h e Q ^ 




In the event the Subcont rac tor does not submi t to the Con t rac to r such monthly estimates prior to the date of auh 
sion of the Cont rac tor ' s month ly es t imate , then the C o n t r a c t o r -hail nclude in hu> mon thU e^t mate :o the Owner for w \ 
performed during the preceding mon th such a m o u n t a a he shall deem proper for the wor* j t *he Subcon t rac to r **or 'he o 
ceding m o n t h and the Subcont rac tor agrees to accept such approved por t ion thereof Jo nis regular month ly payment 
described above 
The Subcont rac to r agrees to mane good wi thou t cost 10 the Owner o>* Contrac tor any and all defects due to 'aui tv 
workmansh ip and or materials wmch may appear within the oe ' iod ^o established in tne contract document* , and if no sucn 
period be s t ipulated in the cont rac t d o c u m e n t s , then such guarantee snail De tor a period of one year trom date of complet ion 
of the project The Subcont rac to r further agree* to execute any special guarantees as provided by terms of the Contract 
d o c u m e n t s , prior to final payment 
In the event it appears to the Con t r ac to r that the ' abor , material and other bills ncurred in the performance of the 
work are not being currently paid, the Con t r ac to r mav take such steps as it deems necessary to assure absolutely that the 
money paid wi th any progress paymen t will be utilized to the full ex ten t necessary to pay labor, material and all other bill* 
incurred in the performance of the work of S u b c o n t r a c t o r T h e Cont rac to r may deduct from any amoun t s due or to become 
due to the Subcon t r ac to r any sum or sums owing by the Subcon t r ac to r to the Con t rac to r , and in the event of any breach by 
the S u b c o n t r a c t o r of any provision or obl igat ion of this Subcon t r ac t , or in the event of the assertion by other part ies of any 
claim or lien against the Cont rac tor or Con t r ac to r s Sure ty or the premises arising out of the Subcont rac to r ' s per formance of 
this Con t rac t , the Cont rac tor shall have the right, bu t is not required, to retain ou t of any payments due or to b e c o m e due to 
the Subcon t r ac to r an a m o u n t sufficient to comple te ly p ro tec t the Cont rac tor from any and all loss, damage or expense there-
from, unti l the s i tuat ion has been remedied or adjusted by the Subcon t rac to r to the satisfaction of the C o n t r a c t o r These 
provisions shall be applicable even though the subcon t r ac to r has posted a full paymen t and performance bond. 
9. TERMINATION OF CONTRACT 
In the event the prime cont rac t be tween the Owner and the Con t rac to r should be terminated prior to its comple t ion , 
then the Con t rac to r and Subcon t rac to r agree that an equi table se t t l ement for work performed under this ag reement prior to 
such t e rmina t ion , will be made as provided by the con t rac t d o c u m e n t s , if such provision be made , or, if none such exist, next 
by mutua l agreement , or, failing either of these m e t h o d s , by a rb i t ra t ion as provided in Sect ion 7. 
10. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
During the performance of this subcon t r ac t , the S u b c o n t r a c t o r agrees to not discriminate against any employee because 
of race, color , creed or national origin As out l ined n the Equal Oppor tun i t y Clause of the Regulat ions of Execut ive Order 
10925 of March 6, 1961 as amended by Execut ive Order 11246 of Sep tember 24, 1965 The executive orders and the respec-
tive regulat ions are made a part of this subcon t r ac t by reference 
11. TERMS OF LABOR AGREEMENTS 
It is hereby unders tood and agreed tha t for the work covered by this subcont rac t , the Subcon t rac to r is bound and 
will comply with the terms and condi t ions of the labor agreements to which the general cont rac tor is a par ty , insofar as said 
labor agreements lawfully require subcon t r ac to r s to be so b o u n d . 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the C o n t r a c t o r and S u b c o n t r a c t o r signify their understanding and agreement wi th the terms 
hereof by affixing their signatures he r eun to . 
WITNES S . 
450 EAST 1000 NORTH GLEND0N CORPORATION 
NORTH SALT LAKE, DTAH 
(Address) 
353 NORTH MAIN 







1. SUBCONTRACTOR specifically acknowledges its duties and 
responsibilities to perform work in accordance with the 
contract documents and to comply with all requirements 
contained therein. 
2. REQUIRED INSURANCE: 
a) The subcontractor shall procure and maintain during the 
entire period of performance under this contract the 
following minimum insurance coverage; 
1. Comprehensive General Liability; $500,000 per occurrence. 
2. Automobile Liability; $200,000 per person, $500,000 per 
occurrence, $20,000 per occurrence for property damage. 
3« Worker's Compensation: As required by Federal and State 
Workers' Compensation and occupational disease statutes. 
4. Employer's Liability Coverage: $100,000* 
5. Other as required by State Law. 
b) Prior to commencement of work, the Subcontractor shall 
furnish copies of the Certificate of Insurance to the 
Contractor for the above required insurance reflecting 
Glendon Corporation as a certificate holder and 
additional insured with a 30 day cancellation clause. 
The policies evidencing required insurance shall contain 
an endorsement to the effect that cancellation of any 
material change in the policies adversely effecting the 
interests of Glendon Corporation in such insurance shall 
not be effective for such period as may be prescribed by 
the laws of the State in which this contract is to be 
performed and in no event less that Thirty (30) days 
after written notice to the Contractor. 
c) Both insurance certificates referenced above must be 
forwarded with original signatures. The Owner will not 
accept copies. 
d) The Subcontractor agrees to insert the substance of this 
clause, including this paragraph (c), in all subcontracts 
hereunder. 
3. PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION: 
a) Do not publicly release information, photographs,, or 
other documents concerning any aspect of the materials 
or services relating to this bid, contract or purchase 
order without the prior written approval of Glendon 
Corporation. 
SUBCONTRACTOR agrees to provide and certify complete and 
acceptable submittals within 10 days of this agreement or bear 
all responsibilities and costs for any delays and resubraittals 
associated with failure to comply with this requirement. 
The following information is required to be shown on every 
subcontract and pay request submitted regarding work in this 
project: 
a) Subcontract number. Assigned by Glendon Corporation* 
b) Required delivery date or date work is to commence. 
c) Authorized signature. 
Glendon Corporation is an Equal Employment Opportunity firm. 
There will be no discrimination upon a person's race, 






















(name, address) /\/[u£Any, UTAU 
CONSTRUCTION CHANCE /— 
AUTHORIZATION NO: -^ 
DATE OF ISSUANCE: I'A' l^'C]6 OWNER: 
TO: £,LCNC>OM CD)ZfDI2/]]70N ARCHITECT: J[l{TC2oNE 
(Contractor) ^ c j0 , - r t 6 7 ^ /\j<jAi?H 
CONTRACT FOR: ARCHITECT'S PROJECT NO: 2rjD/j> 
C.)C'fce&Ai- tbN'JtHuOT/C^ 
In order to expedite the Work and avoid or minimize delays in the Work which may affect Contract Sum 
or Contract Time, the Contract Documents are hereby amended as described below. Proceed with this 
Work promptly. Submit final costs for Work involved and change in Contract Time (if any), for inclusion 
in a subsequent Change Order. 
Description: Poz ART\(IL£. 3 Of CcfoT^aj OoCuniENT^; ^Qu/fytttO 
JlcTiifi^ CciuPunoK) bm uji^l^c z Z3> D/-1Y.5 (£: ^ 3dc.ee 
Attach t [sQiCCCC 
Lump $un\ 
The following is based on information provided by the Contractor: 
Method of Determining Change in the Contract Sum 
JZfFixed ) 
r-i r
 k- > A ( Change in Contract Sum 
• Estimated > . . ° 7T^^ ,p^ 
• . . v - 7 r ' * • 
Q Maximum ) Q Maximum j 
(lump sum, unit prlcw, coit plus fee or other) 
rn e , . ; ~ , . ^ ( Change in^£ontract Time 
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TOWNER): AUTOZONE, INC. 
JP-PLICATION AND CERTIFICATE FOR PAYMENT AIA DOCUMENT C702 „„M,ucuU1s(r,WrSc5ldei ^cio^o, 




450 E. 1000 N. 
N. SALT LAKE, UTAH 
V I A ( A R C H I T E C T ) : AUTOZONE DESIGN
 Ac&\ 
.-,^y> 
APPl. lCAT O N <Q: FOUR 
PERIOD T O : 0 2 - 2 1 - 9 1 
ARCHITEC •"':. 
PROJECT -C 2 5 3 5 
CONTRACT" O A T E : 
Dist r ibut ion 
O O W N E R 
[2 A R C H I T E C 
D C O N T R A C 
G 
I cONTRACTOR'S APPLICATION FOR PAYMENT A p p l i c . v . m n is m a d e for P a y n n ' i i l , as s h o w i b e l o w , in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t he C o n | C o n t i n u a t i o n Shee t , AIA D o c u m e n t G703, s • t a c h e d . 
i 
foflipproved th is M o n t i 
.TO/S'riiber 
C H A N C E ORDER S U M 
^ C h a n g e O r d e r s a p p r o v e d m 
•^prev ious m o n t h s by O w n e 
• N D D . ' H O N S 
TOTAL | 8,278.60 
in DUC i IONS 
Do te A p p r o v e d 
1-31-91 
1 -31 -91 
1 -31 -91 
1 -31 -91 
1 , 3 9 9 . 2 0 
4 2 6 . 2 5 
. 00 
2 9 4 . 3 2 
6 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
i f # : * -
• 'Net c h a n g e bv C h a m m O r c ' c 
6 , 2 9 4 . 3 2 TOTALS ! ___ 1 , 8 2 5 . 4 5 
1/809". 73 
[yTfie u n d e r s i g n e d C o n t r a c t o r c e ' t m e s tha! ' o the be>: o : the C o n t r a t tor'> ' M ' . u w k ' d ^ i ' . 
[ j i f j f o r m a t i o n a n d be l ie f t he W o r • c o v e r e d -'v.- h><> A p p l i c a t i o n mr J ' .n. ' iu 'n i h.is b o r n 
' X o m p l c t e d in aCC O rein nee w i t h t c C o n : OK » ; /< ?t on ' -em N . in,-.; .-»;! . i 'n i ...:m s ha\ e h c i M 
i D a j d j b y the C o n t r a c t o r for \Vo»'» : o r \\ n. set", I I J I M I I U ^ C e ' !' :•<, a i r * : o ' i ' a s m e n i w o n * 
^LSS^cd a n d p a y m e n t s r e c e i v e d f r o m l.he ()••. •N.T. a n d [hat t u r r o n t p . n m e n t s h o w n 
ft
 i r ' e i n is n o w d u e . 
4V • - l 
DETRACTOR: 
I P ; ^ L K facrMrJ !).m 02/26/91 
I O R I G I N A L C O N T R A C T S U M 
LV N e l c h a n g e by C h a n g e O r d e r s 
1. C O N T R A C T S U M TO DATE (Lmc 1 = 2 ) . . 
•: TOTAL C O M P L E T E D & STORED TO DATE 
( C o l u m n C o n C70.V: 
v RETA INACE: 
a. ".. o i C o m p l e t e d W o r k > _ 
( C o l u m n D - E o n GTO.)) 
b. *'.'., o f S t o r e d M a t e r i a l S ... 
( C o l u m n F o n C703) 
l o t a I Kc-t a i naj^e (L ine 5 a - 5 b or 
U )ial in C o l u m n I o |' ("703) . 
n. TOTAL EARNED LESS RETAINACE 
i i m o -I less L ine S Total) 
~. LESS P R E V I O U S CERTIFICATES FOR 
PAYMENT (L ine (t I r o i n p r i o r C e r t m c i 
M C U R R E N T PAYMENT DUE 
(J. B A L A N C E TO F I N I S H , PLUS RETAINACE S 
•"Tini* Liuk^l.ine (>) Hotttt PyJbtki 
M)i)>Lfi[)L«(^Hci:b\<-orn i6!&&afttan*UimS4tiiM! 





















m A M O U N T CERTIFIED. ARCHITECT'S CERTIFICATE FOR PAYMENT „w, l f / I ,,„,,,,,„„„ „.„„„,„„ «.„,„,„</,,* 
j p j a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the Con t rac t D o c u m e n t . i h w d on u n - ^ i e O I M T W I I H MIX a n d the A R C H ! T [ ( ' T: 
'da la c o m p r i s i n g the above a p p l i c a t i o n . the A o j o t e c : c e ^ m e ^ to t he Ov. nor t ha; to the r~> f] [/ 
t^cst o f Ihe A r c h i l . .»cTs k n o w l e d g e m i o r m a h o n a.'u! h e l m ! i l u ' W n . - i . i-.a - or
 ( > . ; . ' o s s e c ! a - \>)V \ '..S'&'^CfcK 
I f id ica ied . t he q u a l i t y o i the Wo:'- , is m a: •: o -da -u e v. :t-h t h e O m t o u • ! ) : 




U A . O O C U M t N ' t C ; ( ! ? ' A ! T | i ( ' A ! l ( ) \ \ \ [ ) ( 0 ' ! i i u \ : i . , . . • : • • . . - . •. •. ; • • . • ^ ; . - , . 
THF A . v U L-ir A v . w i i i . . i . / .. 
: - ; ' . r « » i : r o s M . ! J>
! ) •» o m e n t a a n ( 
<JJY of .19 
• , • • • • i n n u « t j > \ , ^ _ , ^^, 
t h i s C e r t i i i c a t e is nc)t n e ^ o t i a b j i / The A M ( ^ l - I C E R f l r l E D ^ p a \ a b ! e o n l v to l l 
C*on t r ac tor n a m e d h,e r e in . Ksuanc e. f)a\ f n e n t , r 1 ace ep ta ru 'o ot \).)\ m e n t d( e \ M l i i o 
p; e| u( !K o l(» .in \ r i gh ts o l the O w i i o " of C o : I .• lor u i u l r ' 1 hi > L n n t o U . 
HURRAY AUTOZONE SUMMARY OF LIQUIDATED DAHAGES AS PER CONTRACT 
SUB conr 
CONTRACT ACTUAL EXCESS PERCENT COST OF 











SlOU FRONT GLASS 









CCC L T 
HANSON 
UTAH TILE 
B h D GLASS 
WALLDOARD SPECI. 
J & S ENTERPRICES 
WEBOR BRO. 





















































































- 9 5 $10000 .00 
DAHAGES 10TAL 
JOB SUHHARY DAYS PER DAY DAHAGES 
10TAL CONTRACT DAYS 80 
ACTUAL COHPL. DAYS 100 
SUB CONTR. DELAYS 20 $300.00 $6000.00 




450 East 1000 North, Third Floor • North Salt Lake, Utah 84054 • (801) 295-7700 FAX (801) 298-0895 
TO: M E R L I N , 1 - 1 6 - 9 0 
AUIOZONE IS CHARGING GLENDON CORP. $338.47 PER BUILDING ON 
MURRAY AND OREM FOR EXTRA ELECTRICAL PARTS THAT WERE ORDERED FROM 
TEC ELECTRIC TO REPLACE DAMAGED EQUIPMENT. THESE PARTS WERE ORDERED 
BY PAGE ELECTRIC BUT NEVER RETURNED TO TEC ELECTRIC. IF THESE PARTS 
ARE RETURNED TO TEC ELECTRIC WE CAN RECOVER THIS MONEY. OTHERWISE 
WE WILL DEDUCT $338.47 FROM EACH CONTRACT FOR A TOTAL OF $676.94. 
SINCERELY, 
STEVE LEFLER VICE PRESIDENT 
GLENDON CORPORATION. 
RESPONSE: 1/23/91 
THE ITEMS MENTIONED IN THE ABOVE MEMO WERE TO REPLACE EQUIPMENT WE HAD ALREADY 
INSTALLED THAT PROVED TO BE FAULTY AND WE USED IT TO MAKE THE CORRECTIONS. THE 
DAMAGED ITEMS HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO TEC. THANKS FOR BRINGING THIS TO OUR 
ATTENTION AS WE WERE NEVER PAID FOR HANDLING AND INSTALLATION INVOICE FOR THIS 
WORK IS ENCLOSED. 
ENC: INVOICE/COPY TO TEC 
SINCERELY, 
JEANENE S. PAGE, PRESIDENT 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT dOURT £ 33 f7 '(j-j 
IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH V \ ^ 
PAGE ELECTRIC SERVICE, INC. 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
THE OHIO CASUALTY GROUP 
OF INSURANCE COMPANIES, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON DEFENDANTS 
MOTION TO AMEND FINDINGS 
AND JUDGMENT OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE FOR A NEW TRIAL 
Civil No. 910750974 
Comes now the Court and having reviewed defendant's 
motion to amend findings and judgment or in the alternative for 
a new trial and the memorandum in support thereof and 
plaintiff's memorandum in opposition thereto and the pleadings 
in the file and the court's notes of the hearing herein, the 
Court hereby denies defendant's motion. The Court finding that 
the Findings and Conclusions heretofore made by the Court are 
adequately supported by the evidence and that counsel had 
adequate time to present their respective cases during the 
course of the trial. 
Defendant's counsel is to prepare Findings and Order in 
accordance with the Court's ruling, submit the same to opposing 
counsel at least five days prior to the time it is submitted to 
the Court for signature. 
Dated this ) g ^ day of January, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
(yzU<^uu^f ^U) - ~t2> . 
t-2 Distric — ourt Judge 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ruling, postage prepaid on the /^^^day of 
January, 1993, to the following: 
George K. Fadel 
170 West Fourth South 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
Ronald Griffin 
The Valley Tower, Suite 900 
50 West 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
BY THE CLERK 
Deputy Clerk 
